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The Immunity of Foreign Subsidiaries
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act
Melissa Lang* and Richard Balest
INTRODUCTION
A train derails, killing hundreds of people. Representatives
of the decedents sue the train company in state court after find-
ing that the accident was a result of a defective part in the
brakes. The train company removes to federal court and im-
pleads both the brake manufacturer, a foreign company indi-
rectly owned by a foreign government, and the brake manufac-
turer's subsidiaries, which manufactured the defective part.
Can the train company proceed with its impleader action
against the brake manufacturer's subsidiaries? Is the brake
manufacturer's subsidiary immune from litigation under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)? The FSIA provides
the exclusive means by which a federal court may exercise sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a foreign state and its instrumen-
talities.' The FSIA provides that "[a]ny civil action brought in
State court against a foreign state ... may be removed by the
foreign state to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."2 Whether the foreign company would be afforded im-
munity by the FSIA depends on whether the company is consid-
* Melissa Lang received her B.A. in History from the University of Cincinnati in
2001, and anticipates receiving her J.D. from Northern Kentucky University,
Salmon P. Chase College of Law, in Spring 2004.
t Richard Bales is a Professor of Law at Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P.
Chase College of Law.
1. EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 322 F.3d 635
(9th Cir. 2003); Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1994).
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ered an "agency or instrumentality" because the company is
owned by a foreign government.
Prior to 2003, the circuits were split as to whether the FSIA
confers federal subject matter jurisdiction on the lower tiers of a
multi-tiered subsidiary which is majority owned by a foreign
state or its political subdivision, or whether federal jurisdiction
should be limited to first-tier subsidiaries. 3 The Ninth Circuit,
for example, refused to presume that all levels of a corporation,
which are majority owned by a foreign state, enjoy immunity
from suit under the FSIA. 4 Instead, the court held that the
FSIA grants immunity only to a foreign corporation which is di-
rectly owned by a foreign state.5 This approach is called the "di-
rect ownership" approach. The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, held that the FSIA grants immunity to foreign corpora-
tions which are both directly and indirectly owned by a foreign
state. 6 This approach is called the "multi-tier subsidiary" ap-
proach.
To illustrate the different outcomes produced by the two
approaches, assume that the brake manufacturer in the hypo-
thetical is a corporation that is 75% owned by a foreign govern-
ment. Both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits agreed that the
FSIA would confer federal subject matter jurisdiction on the
brake manufacturer (and require dismissal of any suit filed
against it) because it is majority owned by the foreign state.
However, if the brake manufacturer in turn owns 60% of the
shares of the subsidiary which manufactured the defective part,
the Ninth Circuit would not have upheld jurisdiction (and would
not require dismissal) over the subsidiary, whereas the Seventh
Circuit would. This is because the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
FSIA's definition of an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign
state as not including the lower tiers of a multi-tiered corpora-
tion. 7 Because the Ninth Circuit did not consider lower tiers to
be agencies or instrumentalities, the court did not extend im-
munity beyond the first tier of the corporation.8 The Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, did not limit immunity to the first
tier, but rather extended it to all tiers of the corporation. 9
3. See, e.g., Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932 (7th Cir. 1996).
7. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1461-62.
8. Id. at 1462.
9. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 941.
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In April 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the circuit
split in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.10 This decision adopted the
Ninth Circuit approach and held that only direct ownership of a
majority of a company's shares by a foreign state qualifies that
company for immunity.11 To illustrate, if the recent Supreme
Court ruling were applied in the train derailment hypothetical,
only the brake manufacturer would be entitled to sovereign im-
munity. The brake manufacturer's subsidiary, on the other
hand, would still be subject to suit in both state and federal
court.
While the Dole Court resolved the split in authority be-
tween the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Court did not con-
sider a third approach to the issue. Prior to Dole, Judge Kaplan
of the Southern District of New York suggested a "beneficial in-
terest" approach to determine whether a lower-tier subsidiary of
a foreign government-owned corporation should be allowed pro-
tection under the FSIA. 12 The beneficial interest approach
would grant immunity only if the foreign state's interest in its
subsidiary exceeds 50%.13 Thus, the beneficial interest ap-
proach advances Congressional intent by ensuring that immu-
nity will only be granted where the foreign state holds a sub-
stantial interest in a company. 14
This Article argues that Congress should legislatively over-
rule the Dole decision and adopt the beneficial interest test for
determining whether a corporation should enjoy federal subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Part I of this Article ex-
plains the purpose of the FSIA and describes its significance
concerning litigation with a corporation which could potentially
be granted immunity by the Act. Part II describes the pre-Dole
circuit split as well as the beneficial interest approach proposed
by Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York. Part III
discusses the Supreme Court's Dole decision, in which the Court
held that the FSIA confers sovereign immunity upon a foreign
company which is directly owned by a foreign government. Part
IV analyzes the various approaches of determining foreign sov-
ereign immunity.
10. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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This Article proposes that the courts use a beneficial inter-
est test. This test is consistent with the statutory language and
legislative intent of the FSIA. It promotes U.S. foreign policy by
ensuring that immunity is extended to--but only to-a corpora-
tion in which a foreign nation owns a substantial interest in the
corporation. It provides a bright-line, quantifiable rule which
courts can use to determine whether a foreign defendant corpo-
ration should be granted immunity from suit in U.S. courts. For
these reasons, this Article concludes that Congress should enact
the beneficial interest test for determining the foreign sovereign
immunity of corporations.
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was enacted
to determine whether a foreign state-owned corporation sued in
U.S. courts by a domestic plaintiff should be granted immu-
nity. 15 Historically, all foreign states were granted absolute sov-
ereign immunity from suit in U.S. courts. 16 However, starting
in the mid-1900s, U.S. views on immunity began to change. 17
The practices ranged from absolute immunity to a theory of re-
strictive immunity, which was finally codified in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.18 An overview of this progression is
discussed below.
A. THE ABSOLUTE THEORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Originally, it was the job of the State Department to make
formal suggestions to the courts to aid in determining whether a
foreign state should enjoy immunity from suit in U.S. courts. 19
These decisions were made pursuant to recommendations made
by the Executive Branch. 20 Until 1952, the State Department
requested absolute immunity to all nations which were friendly
15. Andrew Loewenstein, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Corporate
Subsidies or Instrumentalities of Foreign States, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 350 (2001).
16. Jane H. Griggs, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Do Tiered
Corporate Subsidiaries Constitute Foreign States?, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 389
(1998).
17. Id. at 394-95.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2000).
19. Clinton L. Narver, Putting the "Sovereign" Back in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or Instrumentality
Status, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 168 (2001).
20. Id.
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with the United States.21 Eventually this process became more
political than legal because the Executive Branch was under
pressure from foreign states. 22  Oftentimes immunity was
granted due to political considerations in situations where im-
munity would not normally have been extended.23 However,
when a foreign state failed to ask the State Department for im-
munity, the courts were required to make the ultimate decision
to grant or withhold immunity. 24 Because immunity could be
decided either by the Executive or Judicial Branch, and as a re-
sult of the lack of a clear standard which each branch should fol-
low in making its determination, decisions were inconsistent. 25
This confusion began to fester when the Supreme Court es-
tablished the theory of absolute immunity for foreign states in
its 1812, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.26 The Court deter-
mined that U.S. courts could not exercise jurisdiction over a
French sailing vessel found in U.S. waters.27 Lower federal
courts read this opinion to mean that foreign states were enti-
tled to an absolute immunity over their public governmental
acts as well as their commercial activities. 28 Over one hundred
years later the Court reaffirmed its decision to confer absolute
immunity on foreign states in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro.29 In
this case, the Supreme Court found that an Italian ship, which
carried both passengers and cargo, was immune from suit in
U.S. courts. 30 Thus, the Court established a theory of absolute
immunity concerning a foreign state's public activities to which
courts would adhere for 140 years. 31
B. THE THEORY OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY
During the first half of the twentieth century, legal com-
mentators began to notice that a theory of restrictive immunity
21. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
22. Id. at 487.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 488.
26. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
27. Id. at 125.
28. Narver, supra note 19, at 167.
29. 13 F.2d 468 (D.N.Y. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
30. 271 U.S. at 576.
31. Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Right to a Jury Trial in
Suits Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 159,
164 (1996).
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was becoming increasingly prevalent internationally. 32 Ameri-
can commentators began to advocate for a more restrictive the-
ory of immunity, which limited immunity to the public acts of
foreign sovereigns. 33 Under this theory, the private and com-
mercial activities of a foreign sovereign were not protected.34
In a famed 1952 letter Jack Tate, Legal Advisor to the State
Department, announced to the American judiciary that the
United States would formally adopt a restrictive theory of im-
munity.3 5 This theory granted immunity for a nation's public
acts, but did not extend immunity to private acts. 36 In support
of the decision to adopt the new theory, Tate cited reasons such
as the growing international reliance on a restrictive theory of
immunity, as well as increasing U.S. involvement in interna-
tional trade.3 7
Although the State Department strove to adhere to this new
policy, determinations were still frequently made on a political,
rather than legal basis.38 This often resulted in inconsistent de-
terminations of immunity.39 For example, in Victory Transport,
Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteccimientos y Transportes,40
the Second Circuit, noting that the State Department had not
commented on immunity, denied immunity on a contract for the
transport of grain because the transport of grain was not a pub-
lic act; however, in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of In-
dia,41 the Second Circuit, noting that the State Department had
"suggested" that immunity was appropriate, granted immunity
on a contract dispute for the transport of grain.
Courts also had trouble developing a bright line rule which
would distinguish between the public and commercial, or pri-
vate, activities of a foreign state. 42 For example, in Mexico v.
Hoffman,43 the Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to a
sailing vessel owned by, but not in the possession of, the Mexi-
32. Narver, supra note 19, at 168.
33. Id. at 169.
34. Id.
35. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department
of State, to Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976).
36. Id.
37. Id; see also Narver, supra note 19, at 169.
38. Narver, supra note 19, at 169.
39. Id.
40. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
41. 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. See Abir, supra note 31, at 164.
43. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
358 [Vol. 13:2
IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN SUBSIDL4RIES
can government. 4 4 The Court justified this decision by stating:
Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction over the
vessel of a foreign government has its effect upon our relations with
that government. Hence it is a guiding principle in determining
whether a court should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such
cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive
arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. In such cases the judicial depart-
ment of this government follows the action of the political branch, and
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdic-
tion. 4
5
In an effort to eliminate the confusion, Congress enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976.46
C. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
Congress enacted the FSIA in an attempt to remedy the
problems discussed above. It designed the FSIA to alleviate the
pressure placed on the State Department in making decisions
regarding whether a foreign defendant is immune from litiga-
tion in U.S. courts by shifting the burden to the judiciary. 47
Similarly, Congress intended that the FSIA, through its defini-
tion of "foreign state," would establish standards for determin-
ing immunity, thus promoting uniformity in cases involving for-
eign governments. 48
The FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity. 49 It is the sole means by which a federal court may estab-
lish jurisdiction over a foreign state,50 and is triggered when a
U.S. plaintiff files suit in a U.S. court against a foreign state, or
a foreign state-owned corporation. 5 1
The immunity clause of the FSIA provides that "... a for-
eign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the States .... ."52 Section 1603 of the
Act provides that the term "foreign state"
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state .... An agency or instrumentality of a
44. See id.
45. See id. at 35 (internal citations omitted).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
47. Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 355-56.
48. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
49. Id.; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
50. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428. 424-49,
455 (1989).
51. See generally Abir, supra note 31.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
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foreign state" means any entity (1) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of the United States... nor
created under the laws of any third country.
5 3
Once the foreign defendant establishes a prima facie case
that it is a "foreign state" as defined by the Act, it is permitted
to remove the action to federal court pursuant to the FSIA.54 If
found to be a "foreign state" under the Act, and not subject to
one of the exceptions set forth in § 1605,55 the defendant is im-
mune from suit, and the action is dismissed.56
Section 1605 contains several exceptions to the general
grant of immunity. This Section withholds immunity, for exam-
ple, if the foreign state has waived immunity or if the suit is
based on commercial activity within the United States con-
ducted by the foreign state. The withholding of immunity does
not mean, however, that the foreign state is subject to suit in
the United States in the same way as other defendants; instead,
the FSIA entitles the foreign state to a bench trial.5 7 The bench
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b) (emphasis added).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
55. The FSIA provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity...,
(2) ... the action is based upon commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state...;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property. . . is present in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state...;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession
or gifts or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are
in issue; (5) ... money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property...
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by
the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbi-
tration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise be-
tween the parties ...;
(7) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking.
28 U.S.C. § 1605
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
57. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468
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trial constitutes a further attempt to establish uniformity in
proceedings against "foreign state" defendants, and advances
this goal in two ways. 58 First, the court's decision rests entirely
upon the judge, instead of a jury decision whose findings may be
inconsistent with other juries presented with similar cases.
Second, subjecting a foreign defendant to a trial by jury would
not promote uniformity in decisions because the defendant
would be subject to potentially adverse biases held by members
of the jury.59 For these reasons, the FSIA confers immunity on
a foreign state; or, when an exception to the immunity applies,
provides a foreign state with the right to a non-jury trial in fed-
eral court. 60
Typically, however, if the defendant is not immune from
suit under the FSIA, it will move to dismiss on a theory of forum
non conveniens.61 This doctrine authorizes a trial court to deny
venue, even though the court has jurisdiction, when the court
believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly
tried in a court in another forum. 62 If the motion is granted, the
suit will be dismissed, and short of bringing the action in an-
other country, the plaintiffs will not have any remedy.
Consequently, under the FSIA, a suit may be dismissed be-
fore the parties are even able to begin discovery. 63 In this event,
an injured party may have no means of recovery against a for-
eign-owned company, particularly if it is impractical for the
plaintiff to bring the suit in the defendant's country. The FSIA,
however, was only enacted to provide a framework upon which
courts can rely to determine immunity.64 The American public's
interest in avenging a wrong committed upon a particular plain-
tiff was not considered when the Act was drafted.65 Instead, by
enacting the FSIA, Congress sought to create a standard which
(2003) (Nos. 01-593, 01-594).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
59. Narver, supra note 19, at 171.
60. In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus. on Nov. 11, 2000, 198 F. Supp. 2d 420,
424 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
61. See, e.g., Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Minde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz
of Ukr., 158 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the FSIA does not
limit the authority of federal courts to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens).
62. Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Kelly v. Syria Shell Petrol. Develop. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th Cir.
2000) (affirming district court's denial of stay pending discovery and grant of motion
to dismiss under FSIA).
64. See Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 356.
65. Id.
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would allow the Executive branch to conduct successful, and
consistent, foreign policy. 66 Because it is not in the best interest
of foreign policy to allow frivolous suits against foreign govern-
ments and government-owned corporations, it is best to satisfy
potential plaintiffs by providing a consistent determination of
when corporations will be protected under the FSIA.
Although the FSIA aims to provide a bright-line rule for the
application of sovereign immunity, it fails because the language
is ambiguous. The Act effectively gives immunity to a "foreign
state." However, the definition of "foreign state" is ambiguous.
The FSIA defines "foreign state" as "includ[ing] a political sub-
division of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state."67 The ambiguity lies in whether an "agency or
instrumentality" is a foreign state or whether an "agency or in-
strumentality" is merely included in, or part of, a foreign state.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dole Food Co. v. Pa-
trickson,68 the circuits were split over this very issue.
II. THE PRE-DOLE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although the FSIA was enacted to provide a standard
which could be relied upon when determining sovereign immu-
nity, the courts are inconsistent in their interpretations of the
Act.69 A uniform interpretation of the FSIA is important be-
cause it will effectuate Congress' intent to ensure consistent for-
eign policy. 70 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits created the split
when they reached differing interpretations of the ambiguous
wording of the FSIA. In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,71 the Ninth
Circuit limited sovereign immunity to the first tier of a multi-
tiered corporation which is majority owned by a foreign govern-
ment. However, in 1996, one year after the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Gates, the Seventh Circuit extended immunity to the
lower tiers of a multi-tiered government-owned corporation in In
re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31,
1994.72 An analysis of both approaches follows.
66. Id. The enactment of the FSIA was not intended to prohibit the State De-
partment from asserting sovereign immunity for heads of state on behalf of the
President. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
68. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
69. See infra Part JII.A-C.
70. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
71. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
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A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ONLY PROTECTS THE FIRST TIER OF A
CORPORATION
Until the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Gates v. Victor
Fine Foods,73 courts presumed that all levels of a multi-tiered
corporation owned by a foreign state fell under the classification
of "foreign state" for purposes of the FSIA; in such cases, federal
courts would invoke subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss the
case. 74 However in Gates, a landmark decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that an indirectly-owned subsidiary of a "foreign
state" was not itself a "foreign state," and therefore was not af-
forded immunity under the FSIA.75
The Alberta Pork Producers Development Corporation (Al-
berta Pork) was established pursuant to a Canadian statute76 to
facilitate the marketing and promotion of hogs raised in Alberta,
Canada. 77 Alberta Pork acquired Fletcher Fine Foods (FFF),
which was parent to Golden Gate Fresh Foods (GGFF), a Cali-
fornia pork processing plant, operating under the name Victor
Fine Foods. 78 GGFF provided a welfare benefit plan to its em-
ployees. 79 When the company closed without notice of its deci-
sion to discontinue the welfare benefits plan, the employees filed
a class action against GGFF, Alberta Pork, and FFF alleging a
violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act 8 O and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1985.81 Alberta Pork and FFF moved to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA.82 There was
no dispute as to whether Alberta Pork met the first two ele-
ments under the FSIA to be considered an agency or instrumen-
tality of the Province of Alberta.8 3 The problem arose in deter-
mining whether FFF was similarly protected from suit by the
FSIA as an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision, or
majority owned by a foreign state or its political subdivision.84
73. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1457.
74. See generally Griggs, supra note 16.
75. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1457.
76. The Alberta Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, 10 Rev. Stats. of Al-
berta [R.S.A.], Ch. M-5.1 (1980).
77. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1461.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 2101.
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168.
82. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1460.
84. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that FFF was not an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state, and advanced four reasons why
FFF was not protected under the FSIA.85 First, the court looked
to the language of the statute to determine whether an "agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state" was itself a "foreign
state."8 6 Second, the court analyzed the Congressional Record,
and found that Congress did not intend "agency or instrumen-
tality" to be synonymous with "foreign state."8 7 Third, the court
found that if Congress had intended to allow successive tiering
of a corporation, it would have expressly done so.8 8 Fourth, the
court concluded that FFF could only be an "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" if the majority of its shares was di-
rectly owned by a foreign state.8 9
The Ninth Circuit first reasoned that a close reading of the
statutory language implies that an "agency or instrumentality"
was not itself a "foreign state" for purposes of the Act.90 The
statute provides that a foreign state "includes a political subdi-
vision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state."91 The Gates court theorized that the word "includes"
does not equate an "agency or instrumentality" with a foreign
state.92 Instead, the "agency or instrumentality" enjoys the pro-
tection bestowed upon a foreign state under the FSIA, but is not
itself a foreign state.93 Further, an "agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state" is "an organ of a foreign state or political sub-
division thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other owner-
ship interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof."94 In combining both definitions, a strict statutory in-
terpretation would not allow successive tiering of a corporation
because the "agency or instrumentality" must be owned by the
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or the foreign
state must hold a majority interest in the corporation. 95 Thus,
according to the Ninth Circuit, FFF was not an "agency or in-
strumentality" because it is not directly owned by a foreign state
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1462.
87. Id.
88. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
89. Id. at 1461-62.
90. See id. at 1461.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
92. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
93. Id.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
95. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
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or a political subdivision thereof.96 Rather, FFF was owned by
an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."
The Ninth Circuit's second argument was that a strict in-
terpretation of the Act suggests that Congress did not intend
"agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state" to be synony-
mous with "foreign state."97 The remainder of the statute takes
great care to differentiate between the two. 98 For example, the
House Report states:
Where ownership is divided between a foreign state and private inter-
ests, the entity will be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of
stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state's
political subdivision.
9 9
If Congress had intended that "foreign state" was the same
as "agency or instrumentality," then it would also have intended
to equate "foreign state" with "political subdivision." 100 The
Ninth Circuit found, however, that this was highly unlikely for
two reasons. First, if "political subdivision" is synonymous with
"foreign state" then there was no need to mention "political sub-
division."10 1 However, the literal meaning of "political subdivi-
sion" implies that it is a part of a larger body. 102 This larger
body referred to in the definition of "political subdivision" is a
"foreign state," as it is logical that a "foreign state" would have a
"political subdivision."'1 3 Thus, just as a "political subdivision"
is not the same as a "foreign state," an "agency or instrumental-
ity" is also not synonymous with "foreign state."' 04
This rationale led the court to hold that in order for an en-
tity to enjoy immunity under the FSIA, a "foreign state" must
directly own a majority of its shares. 0 5  By definition, an
"agency or instrumentality" must be majority owned by a "for-
eign state." An "agency or instrumentality" cannot, itself, be a
"foreign state."10 6  Thus, a wholly-owned subsidiary of an
96. Id. at 1462-63.
97. Id. at 1462.
98. Id.
99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6604,
6614 (emphasis added).
100. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1461-62.
106. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
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"agency or instrumentality," which is not itself a "foreign state"
is not immune from suit in U.S. courts because it is not an
"agency or instrumentality" of that state. 0 7 Accordingly, a sec-
ond-tier subsidiary which is owned by an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state is not protected under the FSIA because
it is not itself an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,"
but a subsidiary of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state."108
The Ninth Circuit's third argument for holding that FFF
was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state was
based on Congressional intent. The court reasoned that, had
Congress intended to allow successive tiering of a corporation in
order to invoke the immunities in the FSIA, Congress could
have expressly done so in the Act. 109 Thus, to read the Act dif-
ferently would provide blanket immunity for all corporations
that are partially owned by a foreign state, or a subdivision
thereof, regardless of how far down the chain of ownership the
entity may fall. The court was reluctant to confer such a broad
view of sovereign immunity when the court could not find this
intent in the language itself.110
The Ninth Circuit's fourth argument for holding that FFF
was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state was
based on Alberta's ownership interest in FFF.111 The court ana-
lyzed the company's direct ownership to determine whether FFF
was an agency or instrumentality of Canada. 1 2 FFF could only
be an "agency or instrumentality" if the majority of its shares
were owned by "a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof."113 Because Alberta Pork owned 100% of FFF's shares,
and Alberta Pork was deemed an "agency or instrumentality" of
the province of Alberta, FFF was not owned by a "foreign state,"
and therefore was not awarded immunity under the FSIA.114
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is not it-
self a foreign state, and therefore is not afforded protection un-
der the FSIA.n5
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1462-63.
115. Id.
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For example, the Ninth Circuit noted that Congress in-
tended the terms "organ" and "agency or instrumentality" to be
broadly construed. 116 The court cited to language in the legisla-
tive record which spoke about the definition of an "agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state."117 A House report noted:
entities which meet the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state" could assume a variety of forms, including a state trad-
ing corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as
a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export
association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or
ministry which acts and is suable [sic] in its own name. 118
The court further noticed that Congress was careful to dis-
tinguish between foreign states, political subdivisions, and
agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states and political sub-
divisions. 119 Had Congress intended "agency or instrumental-
ity" to be synonymous with "foreign state," it could have easily
drafted the language to read that an entity must be owned by a
foreign state, political subdivision, or agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state or political subdivision. Additionally, the court
feared that the opposite reading, such as that subscribed to by
the Seventh Circuit, would expand the immunity beyond Con-
gress' intent because it would allow an endless chain of "nth"-
tier subsidiaries to claim immunity under the FSIA.120
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PROTECTS LOWER TIERS OF A
CORPORATION
The Seventh Circuit, joined by the Fifth 121 and Sixth122 Cir-
cuits, found that an "agency or instrumentality," by virtue of its
status as a "foreign state," would enjoy immunity under the
FSIA unless it falls into one of the exceptions defined in 28
U.S.C. § 1605.123 Thus, where a second-tier subsidiary which is
majority owned by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" is also an "agency or instrumentality" of the foreign state,
116. Id. at 1460.
117. Id.
118. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6614.
119. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
120. Id.
121. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 182 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 1988).
123. Alberti v. Empressa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.
1983).
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that subsidiary is subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction
under the FSIA. 124
This principle was explained in In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994.125 There, Ameri-
can Eagle flight 4184 developed icing problems and crashed,
killing sixty-eight passengers. 126 The victims' families filed a
wrongful death claim against Avions de Transport Regional,
G.I.E. (ATR), the company which manufactured the airplane. 127
ATR was indirectly owned by the French and Italian govern-
ments.128 Because ATR was either named as a defendant or a
third party defendant in all of the suits, ATR sought to remove
the case to federal court pursuant to the FSIA.129
The plaintiffs argued that ATR did not qualify as a "foreign
state" and therefore the suit was not removable to federal
court. 130 To determine whether ATR was subject to immunity
under the FSIA, the district court analyzed the ownership struc-
ture.' 31 ATR was created in 1982 as a joint venture by the Ital-
ian and French governments, and was ultimately established
under French law. 132 Aerospatiale, Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle, S.A. (SNIA) was the French national aerospace com-
pany. 133 The French government owned 91.42% of SNIA.134
Alenia was a subdivision of Finmeccanica SpA, which was
62.14% owned by the Italian Instituto Per La Riconstruzione
(IRI).135 IRI was a holding company which was 100% owned by
the Italian government. 136 Thus, the French and Italian gov-
ernments indirectly owned 75% of ATR. 137
124. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
941 (7th Cir. 1996).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 935.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 936.
129. Id.
130. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 936.
131. Id. at 935.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 936 (stating that 62.16% was owned directly by the French govern-
ment and 20% through a company named Sogepa and "Credit Lyonnais Industria
own[ed] the remaining 17.81%, which [was] owned by Credit Lyonnais, 52% of which
[in turn was] owned by the French government").
135. Id. at 935-36.
136. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 935-36.
137. Id.
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The court extended immunity under the FSIA because ATR
was indirectly owned by the French and Italian governments. 138
In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked to the lan-
guage of the statute. 139 The court found that Congress intended
the FSIA to include entities other than the actual foreign state,
as evidenced by the Congressional House Reports that stated,
"entities which meet the definition of an 'agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state' could assume a variety of forms, includ-
ing..., a transport organization such as a[n] ... airline."'140
The Seventh Circuit also noted that Congress intended the
FSIA to protect foreign governments, as well as separately in-
corporated entities such as airlines or shipping lines in conclud-
ing that the FSIA extended immunity to entities other than for-
eign governments. 141 The Seventh Circuit cited to language in
the Congressional Record that said agencies or instrumentali-
ties could assume "a variety of forms" including "a transport or-
ganization such as an airline."'142 For example, the court cen-
tered the majority of its argument around Congress' use of an
airline as an example of an entity that might be covered by the
FSIA.143 Thus, the court interpreted this language as granting
immunity to entities that are directly owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision of a foreign state.144
Second, because ATR was owned by two separate govern-
ments, the court had to decide whether governments could
"pool" their interests to create a majority ownership. 145 This
was significant because each government owned roughly half of
ATR's shares. The court relied on the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions, which reasoned that the statute did not specify that the
majority interest must be owned by one state, to determine that
pooling was allowed. 146
Third, the Court considered whether the lower tiers of a
corporation could establish foreign state status. 147 The plaintiffs
argued that ATR could not remove to federal court because al-
though it was owned by a foreign state, its ownership was indi-
138. Id. at 939.
139. Id. at 936.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 936.
143. See generally id.
144. Id. at 937.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 938.
147. Id. at 939.
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rect. 148 Although SNIA was an instrumentality of a foreign
state, Alenia was a subsidiary of an instrumentality of a foreign
state. 149 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that § 1603(b) required that
both entities be owned directly by a foreign state. 150 To support
their argument, plaintiffs cited to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, which held that an indirectly-owned
subsidiary of a foreign state was not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA.151
Contrary to the Gates decision, the Seventh Circuit found
that the word "includes" in the Act mandated a broad definition
of "foreign state."'152 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit when it found that the word "includes" requires
that the phrase "agency or instrumentality" is synonymous with
"foreign state."1-5 3 Therefore, an entity that is majority owned by
an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is synonymous
with an entity that is majority owned by a "foreign state."154
Consequently, if a foreign state "includes" an "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" then a corporation that is majority
owned by a foreign state "includes" a corporation that is owned
by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."155
Consequently, the court held that an indirect or tiered ma-
jority ownership is sufficient to qualify an entity as a foreign
state. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit also followed this
reasoning.156 The Sixth Circuit similarly held that a corporation
indirectly owned by a foreign state qualifies as an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA.157 Ac-
cording to these circuits, the FSIA does not draw a distinction
between direct and indirect ownership, and therefore does not
expressly impose a requirement of direct ownership by a foreign
state upon an entity in order to acquire immunity under the
FSIA. 158
148. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 939.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 940.
153. Id. at 939.
154. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 939.
155. Id.
156. See generally Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000).
157. See generally Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th
Cir. 1988).
158. Id.
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C. THE SPLIT WITHIN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue, and dis-
trict courts within the circuit are split. 159 An innovative ap-
proach has emerged from the Southern District of New York.
Two recent inconsistent decisions from the Southern District of
New York suggest a possible solution to the problem.
Musopole v. South African Airways (PTY) Ltd.,160 involved
a plaintiff who claimed an employee of South African Airways,
Ltd. (SAA) harassed her when the employee refused to let her
board an airplane. 161 The plaintiff sued in New York state court
alleging tort and contract claims against SAA.16 2 SAA then re-
moved the case to the Southern District of New York, alleging
foreign state status under the FSIA. 163
Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York found
that SAA qualified for immunity under the FSIA because
159. Compare Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), with In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus. on Nov. 11, 2000, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 420, (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This Article will discuss only Judge Kaplan's Muso-
pole decision in detail. It should be noted, however, that Judge Scheindlin held the
complete opposite of Judge Kaplan in In re Ski Train. In that case, plaintiffs chil-
dren and grandchildren died in a ski train accident because of alleged negligent up-
keep of a tunnel by the defendant. Id. at 421-22. The defendant was Gletscherbah-
nen Kaprun AG (GBK), a ski resort operator that also owned the train and tunnel
where the decedents were killed. Id. GBK moved to have the case brought in fed-
eral court under the FSIA because it was indirectly owned by the Austrian govern-
ment. Id. at 422. GBK's parent corporation was Elektrizitaeswirtschaft AG (OE
AG), an Austrian power generation and tourism conglomerate which owned 45% of
GBK. Id. The Village of Kaprun owned 33.98% of GBK. In re Ski Train, 198 F.
Supp. 2d at 422. Thus, GBK argued that when the two interests were pooled, it was
majority owned (78.98%) by the Austrian government. Id. at 423. Judge Scheindlin
disagreed because although OE AG was found to be an "agency or instrumentality"
of the Austrian government, it was not found to be a "foreign state" which could, it-
self, have an "agency or instrumentality" such as GBK. Id. at 426. Further, the Vil-
lage of Kaprun's ownership of 33.98% of GBK's shares was not sufficient to make
GBK an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Id. at 426-27.
Judge Scheindlin relied solely on the arguments advanced by the Ninth
Circuit in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods in refusing to extend to GBK the status of
"agency or instrumentality" because GBK was not directly owned by the Austrian
government. Judge Scheindlin recognized that his decision in this case created a
split within the Southern District of New York by deciding contrary to Judge Kap-
lan's previous decision in Musopole. See In re Ski Train, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
Judge Scheindlin did not attempt to distinguish In re Ski Train from Musopole, but
merely stated that his statutory interpretation was "better" than the interpretation
employed by Judge Kaplan. Id.
160. See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
161. Id. at 444.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Transnet Ltd., a South African corporation controlled by South
Africa's Minister for Public Enterprises, owned 80% of SAA's
shares.164 Both parties agreed that SAA was neither a political
subdivision nor an organ of the South African government. 165
The dispute was over whether SAA was an agency or instru-
mentality of Transnet.166 If so, SAA would also enjoy immunity
from suit under the FSIA.
Before arriving at this conclusion, Judge Kaplan looked to
both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits for guidance. Judge Kap-
lan relied heavily on the Gates decision, but nonetheless reached
the opposite conclusion. 167 The argument for allowing jurisdic-
tion was that Transnet was, undisputedly, an agency or instru-
mentality of the South African government, thus a "foreign
state."'168 Because Transnet, the first-tier subsidiary, was an
"agency or instrumentality," and it owned 80% of SAA's stock,
then SAA likewise enjoyed immunity as an "agency or instru-
mentality" of the South African government. 169
Judge Kaplan noted that the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether this was the result Congress intended in drafting the
statute. 170 The Gates court reasoned that the statutory lan-
guage provided that a foreign state "includes" an agency or in-
strumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality. 171
The Musopole court reasoned that, had Congress intended a
second-tier subsidiary to fall under the immunity offered by
FSIA, then it would have expressly stated so in the act by using
clear language. 172
Judge Kaplan also relied on the Seventh 173 and Ninth 74
Circuits opinions which examined parts of the Congressional
Record to determine Congress' intent. However, Judge Kaplan
was more concerned with a different section of the record. He
concluded that Congress enacted the FSIA to provide federal ju-
risdiction and a non-jury trial to a foreign state where the out-
come of the trial might affect "the ability of the executive branch
164. Id. at 447.
165. Id.
166. Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
167. Id. at 445-46.
168. Id. at 444.
169. Id. at 447.
170. Id. at 446.
171. See supra notes 75, 85, 90-108 and accompanying text.
172. See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
173. See generally In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31,
1994, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
174. See generally Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to conduct successful foreign policy." 175 Judge Kaplan found this
to be significant, because a trial by jury might not be fair if the
members of the jury are particularly biased against a foreign de-
fendant because of its nationality. 176 To allow the first, but not
second tier, of a foreign corporation federal jurisdiction may de-
feat congressional intent where the foreign government indi-
rectly holds a majority interest in the second-tier subsidiary be-
cause the government will still be subject to the problems
involved with a jury trial if it is not immune from suit, or al-
lowed a non-jury trial. 177 Thus, drawing the line after the first
tier is an arbitrary distinction because it would not serve Con-
gress' intent in enacting the FSIA.
In dicta, Judge Kaplan suggested that the line might be
drawn by looking to the government's beneficial interest in a
company rather than the actual interest.178 For example, if a
government owned 51% of the shares in a given company, and
that company owned 51% of its subsidiary, then the govern-
ment's beneficial interest would only amount to 26%.179 In this
case, the second tier would not be considered an "agency or in-
strumentality" because the government only enjoyed approxi-
mately a one-quarter interest in the company. However, if the
court considered the percentage of actual ownership, the gov-
ernment would hold an actual 51% interest, and federal courts
might hold jurisdiction over the company depending on whether
the court follows the Seventh or Ninth Circuit. Judge Kaplan
declined to formulate this rule, however, because, the fact that
the South African government owned 80% of SAA's shares
through Transnet was immaterial to the analysis. 180 Thus,
Judge Kaplan sustained federal question jurisdiction.1 8 1
To illustrate the beneficial interest approach, assume that
Peru owns 51% of a brake manufacturer. If the brake manufac-
turer owns 51% of a subsidiary that manufactured a faulty part,
then Peru would indirectly own 26.01% (0.51 x 0.51) of the sub-
sidiary.18 2 In contrast, if Bolivia owned 75% of Company C,
which in turn owned 80% of Company D, Bolivia's beneficial in-
175. See Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 447.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Musopole, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
182. See id. Beneficial interest = (percentage of ownership of Nation A) x (per-
centage of ownership of Nation B).
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terest in Company D would be 60% (0.75 x 0.80) and the court
would grant immunity. Because Peru has less than a 50% in-
terest in the subsidiary, allowing the subsidiary protection un-
der the FSIA is inconsistent with Congress' intent to "ensure
that a federal forum was available where the interests of foreign
nation are involved in litigation that might affect the Executive
Branch's ability to conduct successful foreign policy."'8 3 How-
ever, Bolivia holds more than a 50% interest in Company D.
Accordingly, Bolivia holds a substantial beneficial interest in
the outcome of any litigation against Company D, and therefore
Company D will be granted immunity.
Thus, prior to Dole there was a three-way split of authority.
There were two opposing approaches advanced by the circuit
courts.18 4 In its 1995 decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the
Ninth Circuit refused to extend immunity past the first tier of a
government-owned corporation. The opposite side of the issue is
explained by the Seventh Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Indiana. The third approach, advanced by
Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York, suggested a
third approach-the beneficial interest test-to determine
whether a lower tier of a foreign-owned corporation should enjoy
immunity from litigation under the FSIA.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION, DOLE FOOD CO. V.
PATRICKSON
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case that arose
in the Ninth Circuit, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.8 5 The case
involved banana workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala
and Panama who sued the Dole Food Company in state court for
Dole's use of a pesticide known to cause, among other things,
sterility, liver damage, and miscarriages. 8 6 Dole removed the
action to federal court and impleaded two Israeli companies
(Dead Sea Companies), which had manufactured some of the
pesticides used by Dole. 8 7 The two Israeli companies moved for
183. Id.
184. Compare Gates, 54 F.3d 1457 (9 th Cir. 1995); with In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
185. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
186. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001), affid,
123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003).
187. Dole, 123 S. Ct. 1655, at 1658-59.
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dismissal pursuant to the FSIA.188 Following its decision in
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Dead Sea Companies were neither organs nor instrumentalities
of the state of Israel.18 9 In doing so, the court upheld its previ-
ous decision to limit immunity to wholly-owned subsidiaries of a
foreign government.1 90
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Dole could proceed with its impleader action against the Dead
Sea Companies although the State of Israel only indirectly
owned the defendant companies.1 91 The answer turned on the
interpretation of the FSIA. The issue was whether the Dead
Sea Companies were "agencies or instrumentalities" of Israel,
and therefore accorded the status of a foreign state under the
FSIA, because they were indirectly owned by the Israeli gov-
ernment at the time the suit was filed. If so, the companies
would be immune from suit, and the FSIA would require dis-
missal of the action.
The Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that a com-
pany must be directly owned by a foreign government in order
to be afforded agency or instrumentality status for purposes of
the FSIA. 92 The Court arrived at its conclusion using the statu-
tory text and elementary principles of corporate law. 19 3
First, the Court relied upon statutory language when it con-
cluded that, in order to be deemed an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, a foreign government must directly own the
company. 194 The Court noted that the determination of whether
a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
depends on whether the corporation is owned by a foreign
state. 195  For example, § 1603(b)(2) refers to ownership of
188. Id. at 1659.
189. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 806-07.
190. Id.
191. The second question before the Court was "whether a corporation's instru-
mentality status is defined at the time of an alleged tort or other actionable wrong
or, on the other hand, at the time suit is filed." Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1658. On this is-
sue the Court ruled that "instrumentality status is determined at the time of the
filing of the complaint." Id. at 1663. Thus, to be an "agency or instrumentality" the
company must be majority owned by a foreign government at the time the complaint
is filed. See id.
192. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1662.
193. Id. at 1659-62.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1660.
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"shares."196 Additionally, the Court noted that the words "other
ownership interest" when read together with "shares" must be
interpreted to mean ownership interests other than ownership
of stock. 197 Therefore, Congress intended ownership to depend
on formal corporate ownership, as opposed to ownership in a col-
loquial sense. 198 Thus, in the brake manufacturer hypothetical,
because the foreign government holds a controlling interest in
the brake manufacturer, the foreign government will be immune
from suit under the FSIA. However, because the foreign gov-
ernment does not own a controlling interest in the subsidiary
that manufactured the faulty'part, the subsidiary is not immune
from suit.
In further support of its corporate ownership theory, the
Court noted that the same section also refers to a "separate le-
gal person, corporate or otherwise."'199 Through its analysis of
the text, the Court concluded that Congress intended the sover-
eign immunity of a foreign corporation to be contingent upon
formal corporate ownership. 200 If Congress had intended the
statute to refer to ownership in a fashion other than formal cor-
porate ownership, Congress was capable of doing so.20 1 Thus, a
foreign government must either hold a controlling interest in
the company's stock, or own control of the company in some
other form. 202
Second, Justice Kennedy found a corporation to be immune
from suit in U.S. courts only if it were directly owned by a for-
eign government.20 3 This is consistent with elementary princi-
ples of corporate law, which shield corporate investors from li-
ability notwithstanding severe wrongdoing such as commingling
of corporate and personal funds. 204 Justice Kennedy began this
section of his analysis by noting that a corporation and its
shareholders are separate and distinct entities. 205 A share-
holder, by virtue of its ownership of shares, does not own the
corporation's assets. 206 Thus, an individual shareholder does
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1661.
198. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1661.
199. Id. at 1660.
200. Id. at 1660-61.
201. Id. at 1661.
202. Id. at 1661-62.
203. Id. at 1658-61.
204. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1661.
205. Id. at 1660.
206. Id.
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not own the subsidiaries of a corporation. 207 Accordingly, the
parent does not own, or have legal title to, the subsidiary of its
subsidiary.208 If a foreign corporation is afforded sovereign im-
munity solely because a foreign government owns a controlling
share of its parent company, the FSIA would, in effect, allow the
courts to pierce the corporate veil, thereby conferring immunity
upon the corporation based solely on the identity of its principal
shareholders (the foreign government). 209 Ordinarily, the corpo-
rate veil is pierced only when it is impossible to separate the ac-
tions of the corporation from that of the shareholders. 210 For
example, piercing was not warranted in the situation of the
brake manufacturer because there was no intermingling be-
tween the corporation and its owners. The business of the cor-
poration did not become the business of the government merely
because the government held an interest in a parent company.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress manifested its in-
tent to deny immunity to corporations which are not directly
owned by a foreign government through the statutory text and a
reliance on the traditional rules of corporate ownership.211
The Court reasoned that the FSIA extends sovereign im-
munity only to a corporation which is directly owned by a for-
eign government because the text of the statute does not compel
a conclusion that Congress intended to disregard the traditional
rules of corporate formalities and pierce the corporate veil in
every case where a foreign government holds some interest in a
corporate defendant. 212 Thus, the Court held that Israel did not
have direct ownership in either of the Dead Sea Companies, and
therefore the Dead Sea Companies were not afforded sovereign
immunity under the FSIA.213
IV. THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST TEST
The Supreme Court in Dole mended the split among the cir-
cuits over the meaning of the FSIA. The Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit opinion and held that only a corporation which is
directly owned by a foreign government may be granted immu-
207. Id. at 1660.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1661.
210. Dole, 123 S. Ct. at 1660-61.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1660.
213. Id.
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nity under the FSIA. 214 Although the holding in Dole created a
bright-line rule mandating who may be granted immunity under
the FSIA, it did not address Congress' original concern in enact-
ing the statute. Although Congress was concerned with estab-
lishing uniformity in the granting of immunity, the underlying
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity was to promote amicable
foreign relations. 215 The recent Supreme Court decision ad-
vances only one of these goals. Limiting immunity to a corpora-
tion that is directly owned by a foreign government establishes a
bright-line rule that produces uniformity in decisions to confer
immunity upon a foreign sovereign. However, this bright-line
rule fails to address Congress' original purpose, which was to
promote successful foreign relations. Thus, Congress should leg-
islatively override Dole and create a new rule following Judge
Kaplan's "beneficial interest" test.
In dicta, Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York
suggested that the Act may be read "as bringing second- and
lower-tier subsidiaries of a foreign nation within the definition
of 'foreign state' provided that the foreign government benefi-
cially owns a majority of the shares of the entity in question."216
For example, a company that is 51% owned by a foreign nation
may own 51% of another company.21 7 The foreign nation would
beneficially own only 26% of the second-tier subsidiary.218 Thus,
the FSIA would not apply to the second tier. However, there
may be occasions where a foreign nation may beneficially own
an "nth"-tier subsidiary. That tier would then be allowed to re-
move to federal court under the FSIA in the event it is sued by a
domestic (U.S.) plaintiff.
Consider the hypothetical example of the train accident at
the beginning of this Article. Assume that the foreign govern-
ment owned 75% of the shares of the company which owned 51%
of the shares of the brake manufacturer. The foreign govern-
ment, in this case, would only hold a 38% beneficial interest in
the brake manufacturer. 2 9 Therefore, according to the benefi-
cial interest test, the foreign government does not hold a major-
ity beneficial interest in the brake manufacturer. Because the
214. Id.
215. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
216. Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY.) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 0.75 x 0.51 = 0.3825 or 38%.
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foreign government does not hold more than a 50% beneficial in-
terest, the brake manufacturer is not an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign sovereign, and cannot claim immunity under
the FSIA.
The "beneficial interest" approach advanced by Judge Kap-
lan in Musopole is the best test to use in determining whether
an "nth"-tier subsidiary of a foreign government may benefit
from the immunity extended under the FSIA for four reasons.
First, this approach is the most consistent with the statutory
language and legislative intent of the FSIA. Second, this ap-
proach will alleviate the Ninth Circuit's concern that an endless
chain of foreign corporations would be granted immunity be-
cause their government had some minute ownership interest in
the corporation. Third, allowing courts to determine the benefi-
cial interest that a foreign government holds in a corporation
will create a predictable standard which domestic plaintiffs can
rely upon when deciding whether to file suit against the corpo-
ration. Fourth, the "beneficial interest" approach is a compro-
mise between the decisions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.
A. CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE
INTENT.
First, Congress should codify the beneficial interest test be-
cause it is most consistent with the statutory language and leg-
islative intent of the FSIA. When drafting the FSIA, Congress
endeavored to create a bright-line rule.220 Additionally, Con-
gress did not intend to extend immunity to defendants where
the foreign government did not have a substantial interest in
the outcome of litigation.221 Accordingly, Congress drafted lan-
guage that conferred immunity upon a "foreign state."222 Con-
gress defined "foreign state" as including a political subdivision
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.223 Because
the language of the Act can be construed to confer immunity on
a lower-tiered subsidiary of a foreign government-owned corpo-
ration, it is important to note that Congress did not intend to
extend immunity to an endless line of subsidiaries. 224
220. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)-(b).
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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The Dole decision, on the other hand, limits immunity to a
company that is directly owned by the foreign government. 225
Dole does not contemplate the possibility that a foreign govern-
ment may hold a substantial interest in a lower-tier subsidiary
of a corporation. Thus, Dole risks denying immunity to a foreign
government-owned corporation where the government has a
substantial interest in the outcome of litigation merely because
the government does not directly own the corporation. For this
reason, the beneficial interest approach is the best approach be-
cause it complies with Congress' intent to limit immunity while
still affording immunity to those companies where the foreign
government holds a substantial interest in the prosperity of the
company.
B. PROMOTES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The second reason why Congress should legislatively over-
rule Dole and codify the beneficial interest test is because it
remedies the concern advanced by the Ninth Circuit that a
broad interpretation of the FSIA would grant immunity to an
endless chain of corporations merely because, somewhere in the
line of ownership, a foreign government owned over 50% of its
shares.226
The beneficial interest test alleviates this problem by ensur-
ing that immunity is extended, not only to a company that is di-
rectly owned by a foreign government, but also when a foreign
government holds a substantial beneficial interest in that com-
pany. This is consistent with Congressional intent because
Congress is not concerned with litigation the outcome of which
would not affect U.S. foreign policy with the foreign defendant's
nation. A nation that only holds a small beneficial interest in a
company is not likely to be as interested in the outcome of litiga-
tion as the foreign government that owns a large beneficial in-
terest or directly owns the company
C. PROVIDES A BRIGHT-LINE RULE
The third reason why Congress should legislatively overrule
Dole and codify the beneficial interest test is because it provides
a bright-line rule that allows the courts to determine whether a
foreign defendant corporation should be granted immunity from
225. See supra Part III.
226. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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suit in U.S. courts. By granting immunity only when a foreign
government beneficially owns a substantial interest in that
company, courts achieve a uniform standard for determining
immunity for "foreign states."
D. COMPROMISE BETWEEN NINTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS
The beneficial interest test provides a compromise between
the Seventh and Ninth circuits. It advances the policy goals of
limiting immunity whild making sure domestic lawsuits do not
jeopardize foreign policy. Domestic plaintiffs may rely on this
standard when deciding whether to file suit against foreign cor-
porate defendants. This approach prevents the extension of
immunity to an endless line of corporations, and therefore alle-
viates the concerns of the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, the bene-
ficial interest test is consistent with the Seventh Circuit ap-
proach because it allows successive tiering instead of limiting
immunity to the first tier.
CONCLUSION
Congress intended the FSIA to grant federal subject matter
jurisdiction to foreign states so that decisions regarding those
states would be somewhat uniform. Uniformity in the treat-
ment of foreign states within the federal court system would
help advance the Executive Branch's ability to conduct success-
ful foreign policy.227 The meaning of § 1603(a)-(b) of the FSIA
has recently become a subject of hot debate. The Ninth Circuit
led the way in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods when it refused to ex-
tend federal subject matter jurisdiction to the second-tier sub-
sidiary of a government-owned corporation.228 In 1996, one year
later, the Seventh Circuit advanced a literal interpretation of
the act when it allowed successive tiering of a corporation for
purposes of extending federal subject matter jurisdiction. 22 9 Re-
cently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have joined the Seventh in
allowing successive tiering. Thus, the trend seems to be moving
toward a broad definition of "agency or instrumentality" as
found in the majority opinions which allow successive tiering.
227. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932 (7th Cir. 1996).
228. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459.
229. Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 932.
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The Supreme Court ruled on the issue in its 2003 decision
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.230 Justice Kennedy wrote that the
FSIA grants immunity to a corporate defendant that is directly
owned by a foreign government.231 The Court emphasized that
Congress focused on corporate ownership when it drafted the
FSIA.232 Because a corporate shareholder has an ownership in-
terest only in the corporation for which it holds shares, and not
the corporation's subsidiary, bestowing immunity upon a sub-
sidiary amounts to piercing the corporate veil.23 3
The Southern District of New York proposed a solution, in
dicta, which is a better approach than that espoused by the Su-
preme Court in Dole.234 Musopole implied that when determin-
ing whether an entity is an "agency or instrumentality" of a for-
eign state it is helpful to determine the beneficial interest held
by the government in order to achieve the ultimate purpose of
the FSIA, which is to insure that "foreign states" receive uni-
form treatment by federal courts, thus ensuring consistency in
U.S. foreign policy. 235 This interpretation is not only a fair com-
promise between the strict and broad interpretations advanced
by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits respectively, but alleviates
the risk produced by Dole of creating inconsistent foreign policy.
Dole effectively creates the bright-line rule sought by Congress
to produce uniformity in decisions to confer sovereign immunity.
However, Dole does not address Congress' ultimate concern,
which was a rule that would aid the Executive Branch in con-
ducting successful foreign policy by not subjecting foreign gov-
ernment-owned corporations to litigation in U.S. courts, or at
least to produce safeguards against biased jury trials. Instead,
Dole limits immunity to those corporations that are directly
owned by a foreign government, while denying immunity to all
other corporations where the foreign government has a substan-
tial interest in the outcome of litigation. The "beneficial inter-
est" test on the other hand, grants immunity to all corporations
that are owned by a foreign government where the foreign gov-
ernment has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation.
230. Dole, 538 U.S. at 1660.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Musopole v. S. African Airways (PTY) Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
235. Id.
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